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To my father, Robert G. Daddis 
"Then, no matter what we do in the military field there is no sure 
-President LYNDON B. JOHNSON 
"That's right. We have been too optimistic." 
-Secretary Of Defense ROBERT s. MCNAMARA 
White House Meeting, December 18, 1965 
ON JUNE 6, 1944, American, British, and Canadian forces launched their am-
phibious invasion against Hider's Atlantic Wall. Determined to secure a foothold 
on French soil, Allied soldiers labored through English Channel's surf, only to 
be met by mines, obstacles, and the covering fire of German defenders. One Amer-
ican combat engineer in the Easy Red sector of Omaha Beach articulated the fears 
of many Allied commanders fretting the lack of progress on the 1st Infantry Divi-
sion assault beaches. "We were really just pinned down and couldn't really see any-
one to shoot at. Around ten o'clock things looked hopeless on our part of 
beach."1 By mid-day, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, the U.S. First Army's 
commander, was becoming increasingly alarmed over stagnating conditions on the 
beachheads. Fragmentary reports from Leonard T. Gerow's V Corps created added 
confusion. Bradley recalled that as the Omaha landings fell "hours and hours 
behind schedule" the Allied command faced an "imminent crisis" about whether 
and how to deploy follow-up forces. Throughout the day, Bradley and his officers 
agonized over potential German counterattacks.2 
On the beaches, small groups of infantrymen struggled to make their way inland 
under withering German fire. Carnage was everywhere. A lieutenant in the U.S. 29th 
Infantry Division estimated that for every mo yards of beach, 35 to 50 corpses lay 
slumped on the sand.3 Despite the damage they suffered, the Americans slowly 
German nP>1rPnr1Prc 
received his first bit of good news V 
pinned down on beaches Easy Red) Easy Green) Fox Red advancing up heights behind 
beaches."4 As midnight approached, the Americans held a tenuous grip on the French 
mainland. They were, however, still far short of their objectives outlined in the orig-
inal Overlord plans. The 4,649 casualties sustained in Bradley's First Army on June 
6 clearly indicated that putting 55,000 men ashore had been no simple task-despite 
the beach codenames of Easy Red and Easy Green.5 But signs of progress did exist. 
By the end ofD-Day, eight Allied divisions and three armored brigades had made it 
safely ashore. By D+1, over 177,000 troops had landed on four beachheads secured 
by an increasingly sturdy defensive perimeter supported by Allied air and naval 
power. 
Over the next weeks, American and Allied forces made even more tangible 
progress. After consolidating its hold on the Normandy beaches, Bradley's First 
Army captured Carentan on June 12, effecting a link-up between the Utah and 
Omaha beachheads. On June 14, Major General J. Lawton Collins's VII Corps 
launched an offensive to seize the port facilities at Cherbourg, which fell on June 2 7. 
All the while, logistical buildup on the original landing beaches continued at a steady 
pace, despite severe July storms in the English Channel. As Bradley later wrote, 
"France was supposed to be liberated in phases and we now stood at the brink of the 
first: a swift push from the grassy pasture lands of Normandy to the sleepy banks of 
the Seine."6 
This next phase in the Allied operation advanced less smoothly than the First 
Army Commander envisioned. U.S. forces, now confronting Germans defending 
from a series of hedgerows, bogged down in the French inland bocage. Collins, 
studying the terrain on the VII Corps front, knew his subordinate units were in for 
"tough sledding;' and his calculations proved accurate. The 83rd Infantry Division, 
leading the corps attack on July 4, lost nearly 1,400 men and failed to achieve its 
objective of Sainteney.7 The Americans made scant progress on the second day, 
and a sense of frustration began to permeate the Allied high command. Supreme 
Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower recalled, "In temporary stalemates ... 
there always exists the problem of maintaining morale among fighting men while 
they are suffering losses and are meanwhile hearing their commanders criticized."8 
For the next three weeks, the Allies measured their progress in the number of hedge-
rows taken, hardly a basis for sustaining troop morale or displacing the Germans 
from French soil. 
The deadlock finally broke when Operation Cobra, launched on July 25, smashed 
through the German defenses at St. Lo and beyond. Allied difficulties in establish-
ing and expanding the beachhead and breaking out of the Norman hedgerows 
Introduction 
~,..,,",-''T"·rl important operational institutional r1 11 "'"r1 """' 
in particular reflected on how best to assess effectiveness and progress. In 
how did they know if they were winning? Terrain arguably served as the most 
scorecard. In fact, during the Normandy campaign, unit effectiveness and rr.t·nr,, .. r1 
progress could be determined using a number of quantitative 
number of troops or units ashore in France, the amount of territory under Allied 
control, the number of phase lines passed, or number of Germans 
wounded, or captured. American commanders considered their troops effective 
because they were making progress in capturing territory and killing the enemy, 
of which led to ultimate victory. 
Less than a quarter of a century after the D-Day landings at Normandy, assessing 
wartime progress and effectiveness proved much more challenging. When 
States Regular Army and Marine forces arrived in the Republic of South Vietnam in 
1965 they confronted a war in which useful metrics for success or failure were not 
readily identifiable. With a ubiquitous enemy and no dearly defined front lines, U.S. 
soldiers and commanders struggled to devise substitutes for gauging progress 
effectiveness. Their conventional World War II experiences offered few useful per-
spectives. Occupying terrain no longer indicated military success. The political con-
text of fighting an insurgency complicated the process of counting destroyed enemy 
units or determining if hamlets and villages were secured or pacified. In short, the 
metrics for assessing progress and effectiveness in World War II no longer sufficed 
for counterinsurgency operations. Operation Attleboro, fought between September 
14 and November 24, 1966, typified the complexities of evaluating unit effectiveness 
and operational progress in an unconventional environment. It would be a problem 
that would plague American leaders for the duration of their war in Vietnam. 
Dubious Metrics in Vietnam 
In February 1966, the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-
nam (MACY), General William C. Westmoreland, arrived at Honolulu for a presi-
dential summit meeting to receive formal guidance for the coming year. 
Westmoreland had been in command for over eighteen months and had supervised 
the buildup of American forces in Vietnam. In the dark days of 1965, when South 
Vietnam seemed on the verge of collapse, he had managed the allied riposte to the 
dual threat of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units and southern communist revo-
lutionary forces (Vietcong9). By year's end, a wave of optimism swept through the 
American mission in South Vietnam. The U.S. 1st Cavalry Division had won an 
apparently stunning victory over NVA regulars in the Central Highlands' Ia Drang 
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government, •-"-'·..._ ............. . 
At Honolulu, Secretary of Defense S. McNamara State 
Dean Rusk assigned Westmoreland a number of goals to help gauge American pro-
gress for the coming year. Among the primary strategic objectives, increasing 
percentage of South Vietnam's population living in secure areas high. So too 
did multiplying base areas denied to Vietcong and pacifying high-priority 
locales. These were hardly new goals. However, with the introduction of American 
ground combat forces in mid-1965, McNamara and Rusk believed they finally had 
the tools to make substantial progress in all though, viewed 
his overall mission as a sequential process. To commander, summit 
meeting's first strategic objective of"attrit[ing] ... Viet Cong Vietnam-
ese forces at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the preceded any 
major efforts toward pacification or population security. President Lyndon B. 
Johnson had hoped that the conference spur social and in 
South Vietnam, military operations took center stage in 1966.10 
Westmoreland set sights on the northwest portion South Vietnam's III 
Corps Tactical Zone. From there, the communists drew strength from invio-
lable base areas inside the Cambodian border while maintaining pressure on Sai-
gon.11 Westmoreland's target was the 9th People's Armed Forces 
(PLAF) Division. A major Vietcong unit supporting the NVA, the 9th had parried 
local U.S. forces for months. If the division were destroyed, MACV argued, pacifi-
cation of the countryside could begin in earnest. Preoccupied with searching for 
and destroying enemy formations, the Americans overlooked that much of the 
Vietcong's power derived from its political organization in rural villages and 
hamlets of Saigon. Based on their conventional from World 
War II and the Korean War, many U.S. commanders viewed attrition of the enemy 
as a necessary step to achieving their larger strategic ends. Westmoreland 
clearly thought along these lines when he ordered Operation Attleboro launched 
in the fall of 1966.12 
The battles comprising Operation Attleboro illustrated ephemeral nature of 
American gains against the Vietcong. Brigadier General Edward H. Saussure's 
196th Brigade moved into Tay Ninh province in mid-September and immediately 
began a series of battalion-sized probing operations searching for supply caches and 
enemy base camps. The 196th had been in country for less than two months, and 
enemy contact during the campaign's first weeks had been light. On November 3, de 
Saussure stumbled into the lead reconnaissance company of the 9th Division. Enemy 
machine gun and rocket fire ripped into the American formations.13 De Saussure's 
Divisions rushed into 
Air Force bombers pummeled "''-'-"'"-'"''-- ... ...,...._ 
killed and 23 wounded, the Americans had H .................. .... 
Over the next three weeks, the 
,.._..,_u._, . ..,_.. of American units War Zone C. 
November, U.S. 
airmen over 1,600 sorties and r1 .. ,,.., .. ,,,.r1 
fighting alone, November 8, 
General found 
..... ,.,,,,,..,.,, ... with intentional inaccuracies at worst. 1-'"'"'"''1-i.'"' 
mations, exaggerations, and terrain all made 
technique for measuring progress. In a war partly '-'-J,,A.._,, ... u.., .... 
though, there seemed to be few alternatives. As westnrio1:e1amd .. s 
Introduction 
officer curtly stated, "To obtain the attrition rate, enemy bodies had to be ... ,_,._uu .. ..,...,.. 
While attrition formed an important element of American 
hardly served as the guiding principle. Westmoreland believed 
enemy forces would help lead to larger political Even before westna01:e1acnd, s 
tenure, MACY had realized that quantitative of enemy kills ..... .,._ ........ ,..., ... ...,.._u ..... 
measured progress in an unconventional environment. Body counts did not neces-
sarily produce reliable qualitative assessments of enemy's military and political 
strength. While General thought that crippled 9th PLAF 
Division, the first week of November 
They instead withdrew west, closer to their .._,., __ uuv~· ....... ~ ... com-
bat units left, the VC quietly returned. Reducing 
not diminished their political .uu.A ..... , ... n.,,._, 
the enemy was one thing. Defeating him politically was something alt<)ge:tht~r 
Attleboro did not break Vietcong's in 
a point few American commanders realized at 
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If estimating progress 
assessing unit and soldier effectiveness in 
province. During the fighting's opening rounds in early November, American units 
quickly became separated from one another and disoriented in the harsh terrain. 
Westmoreland relieved General de Saussure on November 14 and MACV reluc-
tantly concluded that the 196th Infantry Brigade had "cracked" under the pressures 
of combat.18 Clearly, unit and soldier performance under fire concerned MACV, but 
other problems existed as well. If killing the enemy did not translate into political 
progress, how could MACV accurately measure effectiveness and progress at all? 
How would MACV know if an area was "pacified?" How should commanders 
define "security?" If intelligence officers were unable to provide precise assessments 
of enemy strength levels, how would field commanders know if the Vietcong and 
North Vietnamese forces were in fact succumbing to attrition? In a counterin-
surgency environment, how did American officers and soldiers know whether or 
not they were making progress over time? It is upon these questions, and most 
importantly the last, which this study looks to shed light. 
Measuri Effectiveness 
Separating the assessment of military effectiveness from that of operational and stra-
tegic progress is critical to both army operations and organizational learning. Pro-
gress often validates unit effectiveness, doctrine, training, and an army's tactical 
approach to fighting. Progress on a conventional, linear battlefield is often clearly 
discernable. An army on the offense is either moving forward or not, killing enemy 
troops or not. A defending army is either holding its ground or retiring before the 
enemy. Progress, of course, is not constant. Stalled offensives can recover momentum, 
just as crumbling defenses can recuperate after early setbacks. The Allied breakout 
from the Norman bocage region and the subsequent hardening of German defenses 
along the Siegfried Line illustrated how success and failure can be fleeting. Still, in 
most conventional operations, progress is tangible-to the combatants, to the ci-
vilian populace, and to both sides' political leadership. Such is usually not the case in 
counterinsurgencies.19 
In fact, the unconventional nature of the Vietnam War created innumerable prob-
lems for those measuring progress and military effectiveness. MACV, to its credit, 
realized early on that it needed to develop assessment metrics for fighting an insur-
gency. The military staff, however, produced an unmanageable system. MACV's 
monthly "Measurement of Progress" reports covered innumerable aspects of the 
fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, VC/NVA incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons 
Introduction 
areas 
u1,.,i.1,.,ii,,..,.,. Though kill ratios became a central • a ... ._._.,._i._, ... .,._ 
sven contemporary officers sensed that In a 1974 survey 
of army generals who served in Vietnam, SS noted that kill ratio was a 
"misleading device to estimate progress."20 
Given the complexities of establishing appropriate metrics in a counterinsurgency 
environment, this work evaluates how the American army in Vietnam '-'-'"''·un .. .._._ 
measured its own progress and effectiveness. It argues that the U.S. compo-
nent of MACV failed to accurately gauge performance and progress because, as an 
organization, it was unable to identify what Scott S. Gartner has called "dominant 
indicators" within the complex operating environment of Southeast Asia. In 
oping the dominant indicator approach for assessing wartime effectiveness, Gartner 
has argued that military organizations often misjudge how they are performing 
because a host of variable factors influence combat. Contradictory 
quently result. For Gartner, the "modern battlefield produces too much information 
for individuals to assess fully. So they the available information to "IJ'""--.LJ..l'-
indictors." Dominant indicators thus "represent an organization's central measure of 
performance."21 While much of the Vietnam historiography maintains that 
counts" served as the U.S. Army's only indicator of success in Vietnam, this argu-
ment is too simplistic and unsupported by the vast number of reports generated by 
MACV in attempting to measure wartime progress.22 
In revealing how American officers and soldiers, particularly those assigned to 
MACV, assessed both their effectiveness and progress in Vietnam, this study argues 
that the U.S. Army's ineffective approach to establishing functional metrics 
from two primary factors. First, few officers possessed any real knowledge on how to 
gauge progress in an unconventional environment, particularly within the u.1..:>1..u.1.•1.-0.. 
setting of South Vietnam. While officers understood the basics of political-military 
coordination in countering insurgencies, and faithfully attempted to implement 
such an approach in Vietnam, the majority held only a superficial appreciation of 
the intricacies involved in unconventional warfare. Most American officers serving 
in MACV deployed to Southeast Asia with limited knowledge or practical experi-
ence in assessing counterinsurgency operations. They possessed even less under-
standing of the cultural landscape on which they were fighting. As the Attleboro 
experience implies, notions of one's own effectiveness as much as re-
ality of that effectiveness. MACV's process of establishing what was thought to be 
useful performance metrics thus becomes an important undercurrent within this 
work. 
Second, the U.S. Army in Vietnam often stumbled the '-VJ.H.LJ.•---
a consensus on its strategy. In its inability to develop coherent strategic objectives 
IO No Sure 
to 
bat operations on 
and security.23 While MACY designed these missions to support pacification and 
the re-establishment of governmental control in South Vietnam, their wide range 
undermined efforts at measuring progress. Metrics for a search-and-destroy mis-
sion in 1966 might not be practical for a pacification mission in 1969. body 
count made sense fighting NVA regiments in the Central Highlands. It 
served little use, however, in determining how much progress a Mekong Delta 
village was making in freeing itself from insurgent influence. MACY never articu-
lated how field commanders should prioritize their efforts, for in large part it 
never agreed on where the main threat lay. Pacification and civic action missions 
of Vietnamese main 
force units. The unresolved debate lasted United States' involve-
ment in Southeast Asia and left MACY without a clear strategy to assess. 
with insufficient foundational knowledge of counterinsurgencies and vague 
strategic objectives, MACY embraced Secretary of Defense McNamara's advice that 
everything that was measurable should in fact be The problem of gauging 
effectiveness and progress stemmed not from a lack of effort on the part of army 
officers or a single-minded commitment to counting bodies. Rather, complications 
followed from collecting too many data points without evaluating accurately 
such data reflected progress on the battlefield. Few within the American mission 
analyzed the data to develop meaningful trends. Senior officers thus had no way of 
accurately assessing their level of success in counterinsurgency operations. Rarely 
did MACY staff officers link their metrics to their strategic objectives. Conse-
quently, MACY-and much ofDoD-went about measuring everything and, in a 
real sense, measured nothing. In the process of data collection, the data had become 
an end unto itself. Ultimately, this failure in establishing functional metrics 
tiveness and progress played a significant role in undermining the American con-
duct of the war in Southeast Asia.24 
In Search of Relevant Metrics 
In the late 1980s, Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman 
developed a comprehensive framework for gauging effectiveness of military or-
ganizations. The authors defined military effectiveness as "the process by which 
armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one 
that derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically 
Introduction u 
tactical effectiveness in terms 
logistical support for tactical \..u.;;;.a.~;._,,_,, ... .,,.,,,.,. 
1944 Nor-
1Vtzr-may mean 
population. 27 
If more recent .u ... ~ ................ 
effectiveness, American 
practical experience upon which to This is not to say counterinsur-
gency was unstudied in the 1950s and early 1960s. Changes in U.S. Soviet 
Cold War strategies created an upsurge in insurgency In 
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev pledged support to countries waging 
""''·"J''"''--'- liberation" against Western influence. F. ..!.~\.«HJL'-U. 
countered, having already the .._,h,...,AAAAV' 
strategic nuclear deterrence. In its place, Kennedy sought a more ua.JL"-"''"'""u. 
proach (flexible response) to the American of co1ntaL1n:me:nt, ............. ,."'u"'· 
conventional ground forces and emphasizing use of Special Forces. 28 
changing political environment encouraged a and '-'"-'''""H.-•-•uu on 
unconventional warfare. Interpretations of guerrilla warfare and .._v,u.u•c'-'•'' •• "..,_ ... ~~"""'"' 
operations flourished, from Cuban Guevara to Briton Robert ......... '-'"-"·"''"'-'" 
a host of "specialists" in between. The expanding provoked Vietnam 
expert Bernard B. Fall to lament that "too many amateur .... v ............... ,_- "''"'-'-·L~._ ........ 
have had their hands in stirring the revolutionary 
himself would maintain "the u. .................. , ..... nPr~~1rPF·n 
lutionary War" was that "the people and the army must 
12 No Sure 
tual capacity of U.S. Army officers in the 1960s. 
the French had lost in Indochina during the 1950s because of their inability to gain 
the political support of an increasingly nationalistic civilian population.31 British 
experiences in Malaya and the U.S. advisory role in Greece also seemed to indicate 
that revolutionary warfare would be an essential part of modern conflict and that 
strategy must include more than military elements.32 Reflective officers grasped the 
need to coordinate military and political actions. The answer, wrote Major General 
Edward G. Lansdale in 1964, "is to oppose the Communist idea with a better idea."33 
For commanders on the ground, however, implementing such a proposal was not so 
straightforward. How could a division commander devise and offer a "better idea'' 
once he was deployed to Southeast Asia and engaged in combat operations? Once 
occupied in searching for and destroying enemy units, there often seemed little 
incentive to devote time and resources away from actual fighting. 
American officers largely dismissed British and French experiences for their 
seeming irrelevance to tactical combat operations in Vietnam. Westmoreland 
believed that Malaya's unique environment and political situation offered few les-
sons for MACV.34 Thus, despite a rising interest on the subject, U.S. officers came 
across few suggestions for measuring success in counterinsurgencies. Most under-
stood the political element of unconventional warfare but struggled to find advice 
on integrating military operations into the larger political context of fighting 
against insurgencies. In spite of the mass of counterinsurgency writings, military 
officers possessed few practical texts on the political-military relationships of revolu-
tionary warfare. Even fewer sources discussed measuring effectiveness once military 
units were engaged in fighting insurgents. 
Given the dearth of resources on measuring counterinsurgency effectiveness, it 
seems no wonder that U.S. officers found it difficult to evaluate their efforts in Viet-
nam. Achieving political objectives using military tools was a complicated task. 
Most officers deploying to Vietnam knew population security to be an important 
task within the political realm of counterinsurgency. The question remained of how 
commanders could discern whether their units were making progress. Robert 
Thompson illustrated the problems in establishing criteria based on hostile incident 
rates. A decrease in enemy incidents might mean the government was in control but 
might also mean the insurgents were so established politically they no longer needed 
to fight. Thompson did propose that the quality of information voluntarily gained 
from the population was an important gauge, perhaps indicating that qualitative 
standards were more important than quantitative ones in determining progress. As 
he noted in 1969, "In the end an insurgency is only defeated by good government 
which attracts voluntary popular support."35 For young American officers and 
Introduction 
operating in the same political universe as Vietnamese 
certainly were difficult to measure accurately. 
nature of combat in Vietnam compounded difficulties. No two battles 
or engagements were identical. Environmental, behavioral, and political circum-
stances all varied in ways that may have seemed haphazard to Americans unfamiliar 
with unconventional warfare.36 Further muddying the waters was the "mosaic" 
nature of revolutionary warfare in Vietnam. As Westmoreland's chief intelligence 
officer persuasively asserted, depending on the balance between military and polit-
ical struggles, insurgents often avoided combat in one area while seeking it in an-
other. Consequently, what might have been an effective counterinsurgency technique 
in one province or district might be irrelevant or even counterproductive in,...,,...,.,.,..,~,, .. 
portion of the country.37 This mosaic nature, which many American senior 
seemed to have overlooked, made assessing army progress in Vietnam all the more 
daunting. 
So too did the nature of the American military experience in Southeast Asia. U.S. 
Army policies for the rotation of personnel did little to promote either transmission 
of lessons or thoughtful analysis of unit effectiveness. As one observer noted, 
"shortness of tours for staff and commanding officers (while sound for the troops on 
grounds of morale), together with the conformity of the system, led to a dependence 
on statistical results."38 The validity of these statistics often depended entirely upon 
the reporting commander. With tours of duty rarely extending beyond one year, a 
commander's perceptions could be a significant variable in determining organiza-
tional effectiveness. 
No less important was the MACV change of command between William West-
moreland and Creighton Abrams. While many accounts overstate the differences 
between Westmoreland and Abrams, an important point remains. Shifts in com-
mand focus and in national strategy objectives required changes to metrics for deter-
mining the effectiveness of MACV's own operational plans. Since MACY never 
made such modifications, its system for measuring progress and effectiveness became 
increasingly irrelevant as the war proceeded.39 
Doctrinal gaps added yet another element of uncertainty. Commanders could not 
even turn to their own field manuals to determine military effectiveness in a coun-
terinsurgency environment. Department of the Army Field Manual 31-16, Counter-
guerrilla Operations, while comprehensive, offered scant advice on how to gauge 
progress in an unconventional war. The manual did counsel commanders and staffs 
to develop detailed estimates of both the civil and military situation in their areas of 
operation. This included analyzing weather and terrain, the population, the guerrilla 
forces, and what resources the host country could offer. The doctrine counseled 
staffs to assess the effectiveness of the guerrilla, his relation to the population, and 
the effectiveness of his communications and intelligence networks. At the same 
time, FM 31-16 recommended that planners assess the "effectiveness of measures to 
deny the guerrilla access to resources required by him."40 Lefi: unanswered was the 
question of "how?" 
As the war proceeded, few if any Americans truly knew if they were winning or 
losing. Operating blindly made it nearly impossible for MACV to make prudent 
adjustments to tactical and operational procedures. Such confusion made it equally 
difficult for administration officials to provide strategic focus as the war proceeded. 
Frustration became palpable at the highest levels of command in Vietnam. Major 
General Frederick C. Weyand, commander of II Field Force, offered his assess-
ments to a visiting Washington official in late 1967. "Before I came out here a year 
ago, I thought we were at zero. I was wrong. We were at minus fifty. Now we're at 
zero."41 
A Framework for Assessment 
All this raises the question of whether one can even quantify something as abstract 
as a counterinsurgency campaign. In such an environment, what is a measurable 
standard? One could make the argument that metrics in counterinsurgency opera-
tions are pointless. Political will, loyalty of the population, and an individual's sense 
of security cannot be accurately measured. But if there are no measurable standards 
in a counterinsurgency operation, do senior officials simply measure progress based 
on a military commander's instinct within his area of responsibility? This appears 
problematic, regardless of how much senior officers trust their subordinate leaders' 
judgments. Certainly commanders' personal assessments are important, but relying 
solely on intuition in determining progress is just as troubling as relying exclusively 
on statistics such as body counts. 
In revealing how American officers and soldiers assessed their effectiveness and 
progress in Vietnam, this study looks beyond body counts. MACV established a 
host of other metrics that often contradicted one another and provided a false sense 
of progress. General DuPuy's evaluation of Operation Attleboro suggests that re-
lying on the wrong indicators can result not only in contradictory assessments but 
inaccurate ones as well. Reports exaggerated the damage inflicted on the 9th PLAF 
Division, damage that hardly upset the Vietcong's political hold in Tay Ninh prov-
ince. This relationship between indicators and resultant staff estimates and com-
mand decisions serves as the principal framework for analysis of this study. It will 
examine three main areas in which officers and soldiers defined and evaluated their 
effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations during their time in Vietnam. 
Introduction 
area of analysis can be defined as metrics of mission success takes a 
broad interpretation of combat power, expanding the definition to include political, 
social, and cultural aspects. Naturally, the overall objective of military operations in 
Vietnam was important for measuring mission success. As historian Russell Weigley 
stressed, "to answer the question of whether an institution is effective, we must first 
ask the further question: effective in pursuit of what purposes ?"42 Even while prose-
cuting his strategy of attrition, Westmoreland argued that pacification efforts 
remained the crucial element of American policy. Despite this assertion, body 
counts seemingly became the prominent index of progress in a war without front 
lines and territorial objectives.43 This study uncovers the host of other metrics used 
by MACV to measure its progress. It examines how officers defined and measured 
pacification security, how they evaluated the effectiveness of their Army the 
Republic ofVietnam (ARVN) training programs, and how they assessed the damage 
being inflicted on the enemy's political infrastructure. 
Finding dominant indicators for mission success became increasingly difficult as 
MACV added further metrics to evaluate local support and popular attitudes. In 
exploring these metrics, this study will consider how MACV measured the popula-
tion's trust and cooperation. It probes how U.S. officers assessed voluntary aid from 
villagers and to what extent local residents trusted their governmental officials or 
feared insurgents, who so often reemerged when American forces departed. This 
study additionally reveals the problems MACV faced in rating its performance in 
winning the intelligence war, arguably a prerequisite for winning the larger war in 
Vietnam. Army officers too often stressed quantity over quality in their reporting 
systems. In the process, they at times missed the importance of information being 
voluntarily provided as a metric of mission success. Villagers trusting U.S. advisors 
enough to identify insurgents within their hamlets seemed an important indicator 
of progress. If American forces were pursuing insurgent units without local assis-
tance, conceivably their offensive operations mattered little. Broken Vietcong cells 
simply would be replaced by a sympathetic or frightened population. 
Perhaps clear measures of ineffectiveness were equally as important as measures of 
success. Metrics of mission failures thus comprise the second area in which this study 
analyzes MACV's system for assessing effectiveness and progress. Such metrics 
should have covered a wide range of potential missteps-unwarranted "collateral 
damage;' wrongful detentions, or civilian deaths based on faulty intelligence, or 
enemy initiated battlefield contact. While arguably a negative approach to gauging 
progress, it seems a vital element of confronting an insurgency. U.S. strategy in Viet-
nam depended on units operating within legal boundaries to maintain legitimacy 
among the population. Contemporary counterinsurgency literature discussed the 
importance of operating within these bounds, and keeping track of transgressions 
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may have helped to in a given area. it would 
been advisable for officers to measure untoward acts on 
they were charged to protect. 
The final area of analysis can be described as metrics of organizational effectiveness 
and considers how the U.S. Army assessed itself as an institution. Both historians 
and former officers have held varying perspectives on the army's performance during 
the Vietnam War, especially in the conflict's latter years. This study probes that 
debate, asking if the quality of American ground combat troops eroded over time. 
This institutional-based metric rests largely on factors internal to the U.S. Army, 
such as morale, unit cohesion, and the will to fight. As such, commanders' assess-
ments of their units loom large. Determining a unit's level of motivation and morale 
were among the most intangible aspects of assessing military effectiveness in Viet-
nam. These are critical areas to explore, however, because they affected the army's 
capacity to accomplish its assigned missions. 
Measuring organizational effectiveness is further warranted because of its rela-
tionship to the metrics of mission success and failure. Here, one must distinguish 
between-and separate-the terms "effectiveness" and "progress;' especially for 
counterinsurgencies. As this work demonstrates, the two concepts, while related, are 
not the same. American commanders in Vietnam, however, often conflated and con-
fused the terms. Throughout the war, they trumpeted the combat effectiveness of 
their troops on the battlefield, believing that such effectiveness equated to progress 
in the overall war effort. Yet in the complex political-military environment of Viet-
nam, effectively killing the enemy did not guarantee progress toward strategic objec-
tives. Therefore, this study explores not only how MACY defined and perceived 
organizational effectiveness but how senior officers related these notions to their 
broader evaluations of progress. 
Finally, this last area of analysis investigates whether there was a decline of unit 
effectiveness within the U.S. Army over time. Poor race relations, drug problems, 
and contentious officer-enlisted relations epitomized the final years of American in-
volvement in Vietnam. This study asks if these issues truly eroded the army's effec-
tiveness. It seems important to ask if ostensible changes within the U.S. Army's ranks 
in the early 1970s altered how senior officers wrestled with measuring success. 
Limits of the 
Counterinsurgencies are complex affairs. Former advisor Dave R. Palmer claimed 
that the American war in Vietnam in 1966 included four components: "the air cam-
paign against North Vietnam; a nation-building effort within South Vietnam; a 
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diplomatic offensive to put pressure on Hanoi to cease its Westmore-
ground battle in the South."44 While ground combat if ever, 
occurs in a vacuum, this study will limit its focus to the U.S. Army experience 
the Vietnam War. External variables such as air power and the performance 
allies certainly influenced the U.S. Army's ability to achieve its objectives. 1-1n.n'""",. 
these areas will be considered only to the extent that they shaped the army's percep-
tions of its own progress and effectiveness. As an example, this study will not 
air power effectiveness in Vietnam. Rather, it will assess how army officers viewed air 
power as a means for increasing their own effectiveness in winning the war.45 
Clearly, U.S. Army combat units were not the only American forces operating in 
South Vietnam. American advisors, working with both ARYN units and dis-
trict and provincial chiefs, were intricately involved in missions of pacification and 
Vietnamization. Their efforts in measuring effectiveness had a marked influence on 
command and staff perceptions at MACY. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), 
established in January 1967, attempted to gauge progress in the pacification effort 
and fed directly into the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 
(CO RDS) directorate at MACY. While a thorough discussion of the American 
visory effort falls outside the parameters of this study, U.S. district and provincial 
advisors and those training ARYN units supplied a wealth of data to MACY. How 
well MACY thought evaluation tools such as HES helped assess overall progress 
during the war is crucial to understanding the relationship between pacification pro-
grams and American strategy. 
U.S. Marine Corps operations also fall outside the purview of this study, even 
though the Corps operated under the MACY command structure. Despite their 
influence on certain campaigns and battles, and their oftentimes innovative way of 
approaching pacification missions, the marines ultimately did little to alter the 
course of American strategy or the way in which the command measured progress 
and effectiveness. They often served only as an auxiliary to MACV planning and 
operations. As an example, the pioneering approach of Combined Action Platoons, 
a combination of marine volunteers and Vietnamese militia living inside villages and 
working primarily on civic action projects, failed to take hold at the strategic level. 
More importantly, the marines were responsible for a limited geographical area and 
could not affect the insurgency's attack on large portions of the country or the sta-
bility of the Saigon government. Though the marines offered creditable alternatives 
to fighting the insurgency in Vietnam and fought valiantly in some of the heaviest 
fighting of the war, their efforts, from MACV's perspective, too often remained of a 
secondary nature. 
In the end, this is a study of how the U.S. Army component of the Military Assis-
tance Command in Vietnam assessed its progress and effectiveness throughout a 
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long war in Southeast Asia. existing evaluation models for counterinsur-
gency operations, the army struggled to measure if and how much progress was 
being made against an enemy committed to revolutionary warfare. Searching always 
for discernible signs of progress, either on the military or political front, MACY and 
its field commanders labored to develop accurate metrics of success for an uncon-
ventional environment. They never succeeded. The conventional benchmarks of 
World War II no longer applied. That the army never could determine if it was win-
ning or losing goes far in explaining the final outcome of the war in Vietnam. 
